Abstract：
This paper examines Wang Ruzhen, who came from a lineage successful in the Qing imperial examination system, and his firm Jinyixing, which maintained the longest-standing ties with the Nagasaki Taiyi firm of any Tainanese business. It seeks to analyze how, amid drastic shifts in Sino-Japanese political and economic relations and the turbulence of an increasingly globalized economy, Jinyixing adjusted its operations; how Wang Ruzhen’s status as a merchant evolved; and how he embraced modern managerial practices to meet the demands of a new era. These dynamics reveal the commercial resilience of colonial-era merchants.
This study yields several findings. First, Wang Ruzhen’s self-identification as a descendant of imperial examination degree-holders (kejia zhiyi) functioned as a form of cultural capital. It enabled him not only to expand his local Taiwanese mercantile networks but also to secure mediation by Japanese merchants, allowing him to emerge in the 1910s as a representative trader engaged in direct commerce between Tainan seafood wholesalers and Hakodate.
Second, by the 1910s Taiwanese merchants were growing in power and self-sufficiency. Initially, Taiwanese seafood and sundry-goods merchants relied on Kobe- and Nagasaki-based Chinese merchants who had long dominated Japanese seafood exports to conduct direct trade with Japan. As the twentieth century entered its second decade, however, increasingly Japanized Taiwanese merchants could deal directly with Japanese exporters and even establish firms in Kobe themselves, thereby constructing a trade network linking Tainan, Keelung, and Kobe. In doing so, they reduced their dependence on Chinese merchants residing in Japan and diminished the competitive advantages previously held by Japanese firms operating in Taiwan.
Third, Jinyixing’s withdrawal from the Taiyi Tainan network had multiple reasons. It can be attributed, on the one hand, to the diversification of seafood import sources within both global markets and the Japanese imperial sphere; this greatly increased merchants’ flexibility in choosing suppliers. On the other hand, Nagasaki’s declining competitiveness in maritime transport, combined with organizational inertia within Taiyi, rendered seafood products from Nagasaki uncompetitive in both price and quality.
Fourth, whereas Taiyi entered a period of commercial decline in the 1920s, Tainan merchants established new trade networks and, in response to the shifting fortunes of Anping and Kaohsiung ports, jointly invested in the founding of the Lixing Company in Kaohsiung. Dedicated to transnational import–export trade, this enterprise consolidated Wang Ruzhen’s status as a major merchant in southern Taiwan. These developments underscore the fact that Taiwanese merchants were able to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Indeed, they did surpass Taiyi in this regard. They demonstrated a distinctive commercial resilience that allowed them to navigate both Chinese and Japanese mercantile networks while simultaneously constructing networks of their own.

Keywords：Jinyixing Firm, Wang Ruzhen, Taiyi Firm, Kobe, Hakodate, Seafood

Abstract：
Yiguandao (also spelled I-Kuan Tao) 一貫道once underwent a long period of suppression and stigmatization in Taiwan. Its eventual legalization and ability to proselytize carry symbolic significance in the broader context of religious freedom in Taiwan. This article, based primarily on declassified documents from the National Archives of Taiwan, investigates the challenges and pressures faced by Chang Pei-cheng, one of the first-generation Yiguandao missionaries in Taiwan, in his efforts to establish the ROC Yiguandao Headquarters.
Yiguandao places great emphasis on internal ethical hierarchy, and Chang, being of a junior generation within the tradition, nevertheless took on the responsibility of organizing a centralized headquarters. His name began to appear in official documents in 1959, and after 1963, he emerged as the primary intermediary between Yiguandaoand state authorities.
During the martial law era, the question of whether Yiguandao was considered legal rested not with the Ministry of the Interior, but with the central leadership of the KMT. In response to legislative proposals by KMT lawmakers and growing concerns about electoral support shifting toward the DPP, the Executive Yuan officially lifted the proselytizing ban on Yiguandao on February 16, 1987.
In the process of founding the Yiguandao Headquarters, Chang had to confront both skepticism from other religious organizations and challenges from different sectarian branches within the broader Yiguandao (I-Kuan Tao) tradition. After decades of effort, the Yiguandao Headquarters was finally established in March 1988 under Chang Pei-cheng’s persistent leadership.

Keywords：Yiguandao (I-Kuan Tao), National Archives, Chang Pei-cheng, Yiguandao (I-Kuan Tao) Headquarters

Abstract：
The 1991 “Taiwan Independence Association Case” (Tutaihui Case) illustrates the selective prosecution carried out by Taiwan’s security and intelligence agencies in the early post-martial law period under shifting political considerations. As the state moved toward conditional tolerance of Taiwan independence advocacy as protected “speech,” it continued to criminalize “organized activities” through the Betrayers Punishment Act and Article 100 of the Criminal Code. By retaining interpretive authority over the blurred boundary between speech and organized activities, security agencies implemented a strategy of low-cost repression, targeting relatively non-prominent activists while using their social networks to signal deterrence to workers, students, the Indigenous, and church-based movements. This approach aligned with Premier Hau Pei-tsun’s hardline stance against Taiwan independence and aimed to discourage the relocation of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) to Taiwan.
The investigation relied on long-term strategic intelligence infiltration and inter-agency coordination. The National Security Bureau integrated intelligence and directed covert operations based on pre-martial law investigative models, while the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau built its case primarily on testimony from a long-term undercover informant, Lin Jung-lai, who had infiltrated Su Beng’s circle. Evidence of the “commencement of execution” included leaflet delivery, printing of the Tutaihui Revolutionary Platform, and membership oath-taking. Prosecutors also took steps to conceal the informant’s identity, and the Investigation Bureau later rewarded him, effectively exhausting a long-cultivated undercover asset. These dynamics indicate that the case was not a botched operation, as later critics suggested, but a politically calculated enforcement action. Evidence further indicates that President Lee Teng-hui was aware of and approved the timing of the crackdown as part of a broader effort to balance political pressures and reassure conservative forces.
However, the intelligence agencies misjudged the social momentum unleashed by the Wild Lily Student Movement. Confident in the sufficiency of their evidence, they arrested Liao Wei-cheng in a National Tsing Hua University dormitory without prior coordination, triggering widespread protests that accelerated the repeal of the Betrayers Punishment Act. However, the Tutaihui Case continued to shape subsequent prosecutions. Even before the May 1992 revision of Article 100, authorities pursued additional Taiwan independence cases under preparatory rebellion charges. Despite widespread criticism against such political persecution, the National Security Bureau maintained a friend-foe framework, defending its actions as “lawful enforcement” while continuing counter-propaganda efforts. This suggests that despite legal reform, the underlying logic of surveillance and political control persisted within Taiwan’s intelligence apparatus.

Keywords：Taiwan Independence Association (Tutaihui), Hai Lei Project, Ching-Feng Project, National Security Bureau, Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, Betrayers Punishment Act, Su Beng

Abstract：
This study examines how tea farmers in Lugu and surrounding mid- to high-elevation tea-growing regions in Taiwan have reorganized labor for tea leaf plucking since the 1970s. Drawing on official archives, tea competition evaluation reports, and oral histories, it shows how adjustments were made in response to terrain constraints, plantation expansion, evolving quality perceptions, and changes in labor supply, thereby shaping local production models and management strategies. The analysis highlights the dynamic relationship between hand-picking practices and tea industry development.
As Taiwan’s tea sector shifted from an export-oriented model to one driven by domestic consumption, tea drinking became more widespread, and Dong Ding tea emerged as a premium product. Hand-picking consequently became a key marker of quality. To meet market preferences, farmers widely adopted the Qingxin Oolong cultivar, leading to highly concentrated harvesting periods and intensifying short-term labor shortages. Under these conditions, farmers continued to rely on hand-picking to preserve product quality and reputation. Meanwhile, the expansion of tea plantations and the insufficiency of local labor prompted a shift from traditional mutual-aid arrangements to the hiring of professional tea-picking crews.
Traditional labor exchange arrangements relied on informal, relationship-based constraints and shared quality norms to ensure consistent plucking standards. In contrast, hired laborers, typically paid by weight, were incentivized to maximize output, often resulting in uneven quality and potential damage to tea leaves. This created a persistent tension between efficiency and quality. The study argues that, beyond processing techniques and competition systems, the organization, timing, and standards of tea plucking are crucial factors influencing production stability and flavor outcomes.
In responding to market expectations and changing labor conditions, tea farmers demonstrated considerable adaptive agency. While hand-picking functioned as a guarantee of quality, it also became a structural constraint limiting production flexibility. This study challenges the linear assumption that mechanization necessarily replaces manual labor, and instead emphasizes farmers’ strategic decision-making within the interplay of terrain conditions, quality norms, and market expectations.

Keywords：Dong Ding Tea, Labor Allocation Mechanisms, Labor Exchange, Mechanization, Hand-picking