Abstract：
　　 In the historiography of the Japanese Taiwan expedition there has been a general consensus that Charles Le Gendre (former U.S. consul for Xiamen) had a major influence on the policies and plans for the Meiji army’s invasion of southern Taiwan in 1874, as well as over the negotiations of 1873 and 1874 that enabled and resolved the expedition. Despite historians’ debates over the extent of Le Gendre’s impact, there is general agreement on the primary aspects of Le Gendre’s influence: that Le Gendre provided plans and rationale for Meiji Japan’s first imperialistic adventure, and that he recommended strategies for Japanese ambassadors negotiating relations with Qing officials in Beijing.
　　 This article takes an alternative approach to this issue by systematically investigating the transformation in Charles Le Gendre’s views (after he left Xiamen in October 1872) concerning Qing jurisdiction over aboriginal Taiwan, methods for dealing with Qing officials to punish the murderers of shipwrecked Ryūkyūans in 1871, and his apprehensions of indigenous affairs at the southern end of the island. Sources commonly used by scholars to assess Le Gendre’s influence are also summarized and assessed, suggesting the need for greater care in employing certain documents. The article concludes that despite his substantial knowledge of Formosan affairs, his engagement with indigenous and settler communities, and his experience negotiating with the Chinese officials, Charles Le Gendre’s views of these peoples, affairs and bureaucrats were transformed as a result of his involvement with the major Japanese officials, civil and military, who planned, implemented and negotiated the Taiwan expedition.

Keywords：Charles Le Gendre, Taiwan Expedition, 1874, Taiwan Incident, Rover Incident, Meiji Japan

Abstract：
　　 The Russo-Japanese War was a conflict between the Japanese Empire and the Russian Empire over dominance in Korea and Manchuria. For colonial Taiwan, it marked the first international war since Japan’s annexation of the island in 1895. However, the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the colony has received relatively little scholarly attention, particularly in relation to its effects on individual economic actors.
　　 From a microeconomic perspective, how did Japan’s wartime tax policies, the requisitioning of merchant ships for military use, and the broader economic climate during the war affect individual merchants and trading firms? Furthermore, how did these merchants and firms adapt and make decisions in response to challenges?
　　 This article draws on the surviving documents of the Chen Yuanshun Firm in Dadaocheng, Taipei, dating from 1904 to 1906, as its primary source material. It examines the firm’s responses to temporary policies and conditions resulting from the Russo-Japanese War, focusing on issues such as increased taxation, shipping and war-risk insurance, and changes in trade relationships. Specifically, the study analyzes how the Chen Yuanshun Firm, which had been engaged in direct rice and seafood trade with Japan since 1899 through the Chinese merchants Chen Ruichun and his son in Nagasaki, navigated these challenges. The study also elucidates the broader historical significance of these responses.
　　 This study finds that the Chen Yuanshun Firm capitalized on the surge in export trade between Taiwan and Japan, which was facilitated by imperial and colonial government policies, seizing the opportunity to expand its operations. During the Russo-Japanese War, the increased demand for rice allowed the firm’s manager, Chen Tiansong, to gain significant recognition, particularly due to the colonial government’s implementation of a rice export inspection system. The firm also took advantage of the large-scale export of tea dust used in the production of Russian brick tea, ultimately transforming itself from an agent to a business partner of the Taiyi Firm.
　　Following this shift to partnership, both parties actively collaborated to address issues related to wartime shipping and insurance. They also maintained robust, multilateral trade networks involving rice, seafood, and general goods across Taipei, Nagasaki, Kobe, and Shanghai. Through mutual introductions, they further expanded their commodity trade to Shanghai and Hong Kong, leveraging existing networks.

Keywords：Russo-Japanese War, Rice, Tea dust, Taxation, Insurance, Shipping

Abstract：
　　 The Central Bookstore, founded in 1927, played a key role in promoting social and cultural reforms in central Taiwan and remained a hub for intellectual exchange until the post-war period. Current studies focus on the works published by the bookstore during this time, particularly those by Chang Shen-chieh, as well as the interactions between Hsu Fukuan and the bookstore’s leadership. As a result, scholars often emphasize the importance of Confucian values within this intellectual community. This paper argues that, in the early post-war period, the bookstore’s leaders continued the social ideals of the pre-war Wufeng I-hsin Society, but their activities were deeply affected by the 228 Incident. In response, the bookstore strategically engaged with the party-state system through its publishing activities, promoting its own ideas and values. Comparing the Confucian discourses of Chang Shen-chieh and Hsu Fu-kuan, the paper suggests that, while both expressed sympathy toward Confucian traditions, their emotional and ideological frameworks differed. The publications reflect the tension between local intellectuals and the ruling authorities, most clearly evident in Chang Shen-chieh’s Confucian discourse. In contrast, Hsu Fu-kuan’s Confucian thought largely reflects internal ideological disputes within the ruling ethnic group. From an intellectual history perspective, the relationship between the bookstore and Hsu Fu-kuan is less about shared identification with Confucianism and more about a mutual emphasis on human dignity as a core value under party-state rule.

Keywords：Taiwanese Confucianism, Hung Yen-chiu, Lin Pan-long, Qiu Miao-qiang, Lu Shi-xian

Abstract：
　　 This article examines the impact of the 1960 collapse of South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s regime, triggered by widespread mass protests, on Taiwan’s domestic situation and the response of its authoritarian government. Through this analysis, I highlight the key characteristics of Taiwan’s authoritarian system.
　　 Since the 1950s, Taiwanese local elites had planned to form an opposition party and sought to collaborate with mainlander elites from the ‘Free China’ group. However, they never put these plans into action. In 1960, the political upheaval in South Korea emboldened opposition activists in Taiwan, who believed that U.S. intervention in South Korea signaled a shift in American policy. This belief prompted them to form an opposition party. In response, Taiwan’s authoritarian regime closely monitored their activities, mobilized intelligence networks, and implemented a range of countermeasures.
　　This study reveals that the mass uprising in South Korea deeply unsettled Taiwan’s intelligence agencies. They feared that similar unrest could spread to Taiwan, potentially bringing sensitive issues such as Taiwanese-Mainlander relations and the Taiwan independence movement to the forefront. Furthermore, the intelligence agencies harbored deep distrust toward the U.S. government. At the same time, they were wary of the risks associated with using military force to suppress uprisings, as the majority of the military consisted of Taiwanese soldiers. Instead, the intelligence agencies devised strategies in advance to ‘depoliticize and reduce unrest,’ ‘avoid bloodshed,’ and implement tactics such as co-opting, dividing, and disintegrating opposition forces.
　　To counter the opposition movement, Taiwan’s authoritarian regime adopted a multifaceted strategy of co-opting opponents, suppressing dissent, and mobilizing the media to discredit the movement. Ultimately, the authorities arrested Lei Zhen and others, successfully resolving the crisis. This process highlights a key difference between the authoritarian systems of Taiwan and South Korea. As an external minority ruling over a majority, the Kuomintang government avoided direct confrontation with local society. Instead, Taiwan’s authoritarian regime relied on meticulous and sophisticated methods to maintain societal control.

Keywords：Chiang Kai-shek, Rhee Syngman, Chiang Ching-kuo, Lei Zhen, Opposition Movement, Chinese Democracy Party, National Security Agency

Abstract：
　　 This monolingual Sinkang manuscript was one of the 29 manuscripts purchased by Joseph Steere in Gongana in January 1874. It was first published in the journal Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Vol. 49) issued in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1907. Both Murakami (1933) and Li (2010) overlooked this manuscript in their collections and studies of Sinkang manuscripts. Professor Hsin-hui Chiu of National Tsing Hua University discovered it in the journal and made it available to us. We subsequently retrieved a clearer copy of the manuscript in 2016, though we had not worked on it until now for various reasons. In this study, we have transcribed and interpreted the text, consulting Ogawa’s unpublished Sideia-English vocabulary. Following the same format and abbreviations as used in Li’s (2010) monograph, we provide interlinear glosses and free translations in both Chinese and English, along with some morphological analysis. This study corrects several transcription errors found in the earlier publications on Sinkang manuscripts. A scanned copy of this new Sinkang manuscript is also included here for reference.

Keywords：Siraya, Sinkang Manuscript, Monolingual Manuscript, Transcription, Interpretation