This study primarily focuses on the statistical data on prewar Japan’s civil service examinations, and it also attempts to evaluate the bureaucratic system and The first part examines prewar Japan’s administrative divisions of the higher civil service examination, offers a comparison of Taiwan with Korea, and examines the flow of administrators in the empire, paying specific attention to the issue of examinations as a channel of social mobility with regard to successful Taiwanese candidates. The second part analyzes the complete list of all the available successful candidates of the lower civil service examinations annually held by the Governor-General from 1899 through 1944, highlights the structural changes in the ethnic ratios between Japanese and Taiwanese, and traces and maps the distribution of the Japanese in terms of their birthplaces in Japan proper. I conclude by suggesting that, first, the flow of administrators in Japan’s colonial empire, in the case of successful candidates of the higher civil service examination, was limited to the circulation between the colony of appointment and Japan proper, thus only few managerial and technical cadres took up the role of colonial pioneers in the initial stage of the expansion of the empire. Second, the lower civil service examination, at least in the case of Taiwan, served only a very limited role in terms of providing a “ladder of success” for the lowest-level government officials or public officials. Indeed, other channels for promotion, such as seniority or evaluation by a professionally appointed committee, offered better alternative routes for “rising in society” in terms of social mobility. Third, while the bureaucratic system based on the organizational law of officials was an important mechanism for Japan’s colonial administration, the crux of its operation in fact lay in the structure out side of the bureaucracy.
Keywords：civil service examination, colonial administration, bureaucracy, higher-ranking officials, lower-ranking officials
Local Authorities and Elementary School Education in the Colonial Days of Korea
In administering Korean elementary education, the Chosen Government-general (Chosen sotokufu, established in 1910) followed a unique colonial policy by segregating Korean school children from Japanese school children. Under such a segregation policy, Japanese and Korean pupils had separate classrooms, and the education budgets were also funded separately. In other words, Japanese and Koreans provided for the education of their children with their own respective resources. Such a practice started in 1876 when Japanese merchants first came to reside in Korea. The then Japanese Colony Councils in Chosen/Korea, including Kyoryumindan and Nihonjinkai, raised their own funds to provide education for Japanese school children throughout Korea. This kind of unique education system was not to be seen in Taiwan, Sakhalin or Manchuria.
Japanese School Councils (Gakkokumiai) were composed of Japanese residents who managed their schools autonomously and provided faculty, books, and other essential services for their elementary pupils. On the other hand, the School Funds (Gakkohi) were composed of native Koreans, who administered and provided generally poor services for the Korean children until the end of the Japanese colonial rule.A substantial number of Korean children missed elementary school education due primarily to the insufficient funds and also because of the lack of autonomy. Constant interferences by such special local authorities as cites (fu), towns (yu) and villages (men) tended to weaken the effectiveness of general education.
Keywords：the Government-general of Chosen, elementary school education, the Japanese Colony Council, the special local authorities.
The "Gendarme-oriented" Police System in the Japanese Colonial Empire: The Transfer of Models of Rule Used in Colonial Korea to Kwantung Province and Manchukuo
This essay is intended as a critical review of Japanese "imperial history," using that term to include consideration of both directly ruled colonies and occupied territories, as it has come to be understood in recent years. For this purpose, special attention is paid to the "gendarme-oriented" police system (kenpei keisatsu seido) that was first created in 1910 in Colonial Korea and then introduced to Kwantung Province in Northeastern China in 1917-19 and to Manchukuo in 1934-37.
Previous research in "imperial history" has dealt primarily with the history of thought, and has tended to focus on the relations between the Japanese mainland and the colonies, taking the mainland as the central axis. This paper, however, based on the theory of "transfer of models of rule," attempts to examine the political and institutional aspects of imperial history by considering the way the "gendarme-oriented" police system was transplanted from Korea to other colonies. This essay thus tries to present a different viewpoint from earlier studies. It reveals that although the military police system was introduced in other colonies, substantial changes occurred as the Colonial Korean model was adapted to the situation of each colony.
This paper compares and analyzes the crux of national integration in Imperial Japan, with specific attention addressed to the reforms of the local system carried out in Japan proper (1929) and its two major colonies, Korea (1930) and Taiwan (1935).
Essentially, I argue that it was the reform of the local government carried out by the government of Japan that shaped the empire-wide national integration during the war; and that the main contributing factor for the empire integration in Korea and Taiwan was the local reforms carried out in 1930 and 1935 respectively. The local systems in the two colonies were by and large an extension of that in Japan proper, and national integration was based on a discriminatory assimilation policy. In this sense, I contend that the Japanese Empire reorganized the government comprehensively into a fascist regime, and that the key to this process lays in the reform of the three local systems.
Of critical importance, in my opinion, is that the two Japanese colonial governments, Korea and Taiwan, had geared up for the war far earlier than Japan proper. In a comparative approach I come to a conclusion that the autonomy of the two colonial governments had come to be severely restricted even prior to 1937, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War: in Korea since 1930; and in Taiwan, after 1935. By contrast, it was not until in 1943 that Japan began to change the local system for war.